The Shannon theory of cipher systems is combined with recent work on guessing values of random variables. The security of encryption systems is measured in terms of moments of the number of guesses needed for the wiretapper to uncover the plaintext given the cryptogram. While the encrypter aims at maximizing the guessing e ort, the wiretapper strives to minimize it, e.g., by ordering guesses according to descending order of posterior probabilities of plaintexts given the cryptogram. For a memoryless plaintext source and a given key rate, a single-letter characterization is given for the highest achievable guessing exponent function, that is, the exponential rate of theth moment of the number of guesses as a function of the plaintext message length. Moreover, we demonstrate asymptotically optimal strategies for both encryption and guessing, which are universal in the sense of being independent of the statistics of the source. The guessing exponent is then investigated as a function of the key rate and related to the large deviations guessing performance.
Introduction
In the classical Shannon-theoretic approach to cryptology 10], the security of cipher systems is traditionally measured in terms of the equivocation, that is, the conditional entropy of the plaintext (or the key) given the cryptogram. As is well known (see, e.g., 8]), this conditional entropy can be at most as large as the rate of the purely random key stream. Thus, perfect theoretical secrecy is attainable if and only if the key rate is at least as large as the message rate. This pessimistic result has stimulated Shannon to establish also the notion of practical secrecy, which is measured by the average amount of work required to break the key given a certain amount of ciphertext. Di e and Hellman 5] were the rst to show that practical secrecy (or computational security in their terminology) is possible without any transfer of secret key between the sender and the legitimate receiver. The notion of computational security relies on the fact that certain computational tasks (such as factoring, or taking discrete logarithms of very large numbers) are considered di cult because there are no available procedures of performing them within reasonable amount of computation time.
Ever since these two pioneering papers of Shannon 10] and Di e and Hellman 5] have been published, there has been a vast amount of research work on both theoretical and practical aspects of cryptography, which has been summarized in several excellent tutorial papers (see, e.g., 7], 8], 11]). The universal assumption in most of these works is that, regardless of the computational resources that the enemy may have, s/he has exactly one chance to estimate the plaintext message or the key based on cryptogram (and perhaps also other side information that might be available). Success or failure are then determined by some measure of quality of this estimator, such as the probability of error or the distortion. The rationale behind this assumption is that in certain instances of the secure communications problem, the enemy may not have the chance to verify whether the estimated message is correct and to improve it if not.
But in other instances of the problem, the enemy eavesdropper might have a testing mechanism by which s/he can know whether his estimate was correct, and then more chances to guess the message in case of failure. For example, the enemy may wish to break an encrypted version of a secret personal veri cation information and/or an encrypted password into a computer account, or a bank account contacted via the Internet, or any other classi ed database that consists of sensitive information. Here it is clear that upon the rst successful estimate, or guess, the system becomes accessible and hence the above mentioned testing mechanism naturally exists. In such cases, the enemy has the option to sequentially submit multiple estimates, or guesses, where at each trial, the fact that all previous guesses have failed, serves as an additional side information for the next guess. The work of Hellman 6] can be considered as one step in this direction of multiple guessing. Hellman proposed to measure the degree of security of a cryptosystem in terms of the expected number of spurious messages, i.e., the expected number of plaintext-key combinations that may explain the given cryptogram. The assumption in 6] is that the number of meaningful messages of a given length N within the language of the source, is very small compared to the total number of possible N-vectors.
In this paper, we aim at characterizing more directly the best attainable moments of the number of guesses that the eavesdropper may have to submit before success. To this end, the Shannon theory of cipher systems is combined with recent work on guessing values of random variables 1], 2]. Assuming that the generation of each guess demands a certain amount of computational burden on the wiretapper's part, this gives an alternative notion of computational security.
We consider Shannon's model of a secrecy system 10], where a message X = (X 1 ; : : : ; X N ) is to be communicated as securely as possible from a transmitter to a legitimate receiver.
The transmitter and receiver have access to a common key string of K purely random bits U = (U 1 ; : : : ; U K ) that is independent of X. The transmitter generates a cryptogram Y = f N (X; U) and sends it over a public channel to the receiver. The cryptogram Y is a string (possibly, of variable length) over an alphabet that is not necessarily the same as the source alphabet. The encryption function is invertible given the key in the sense that there exists an inverse, decryption function X = f ?1 N (Y; U) to be used by the legitimate receiver who observes both Y and U. An enemy wiretapper, who knows the encryption function f N (and hence also the decryption function f ?1 N ) and the statistics of the plaintext source, but not the key itself, aims at decrypting X from the observed cryptogram Y only.
The wiretapper has a test mechanism by which s/he can identify whether any given candidate messageX is the true message. Given the encryption function f N and the probability mass function of the plaintext messages P(X), the posterior probabilities of all hypothesized plaintexts given the cryptogram, P(XjY), are all completely determined. Then, it is clear that the best guessing strategy (in any reasonable sense) is to rst guess the most likely X given Y, then try the second most likely guess, and so on, until eventually, the correct message is found. For a given sequential guessing strategy, i.e., an ordered list of guesses G N = fx 1 N log EfG N (XjY) g; (2) where both limits are taken under the regime lim N!1 K=N = R. Our main result is that E + (R; ) and E ? (R; ) are equal (i.e., the lim inf and lim sup are in fact limits) and both are given by the single-letter expression E(R; ) 4 = max Q h(Q; R) ? D(QjjP)]; (3) where h(Q; R) 4 = minfH(Q); Rg, P is the memoryless source that governs the plaintext message, H(Q) is the entropy associated with a memoryless source Q, and D(QjjP) is the information divergence between Q and P. Moreover, E(R; ) is attainable by encryption and guessing strategies that are universal in the sense of being independent of P and .
We also investigate the guessing exponent function E(R; ) and examine its behavior as a function of R for xed . This study reveals that E(R; ) exhibits di erent behavior in three di erent regions. For rates smaller than the entropy of the source H(P), the guessing exponent grows linearly as E(R; ) = R, which means that the key space is su ciently small that exhaustive search over all 2 K = 2 NR possible key strings is the best thing to do, regardless of the statistics of the message source. On the other extreme, for key rates beyond a certain threshold that is larger than H(P), the amount of randomness introduced by the key is so large that the cryptogram becomes virtually useless for the purpose of guessing. In this case, the wiretapper may ignore the cryptogram altogether and submit`blind' guesses that are based only upon prior knowledge of P. The value of E(R; ) coincides, in this range, with the guessing exponent without side information 1]. The threshold rate beyond which E(R; ) exhibits this plateau behavior is given by the entropy H(P ) of an auxiliary memoryless source P whose letter probabilities are proportional to those of the original source P, raised to the power of 1=(1+ ). Since H(P ) is never smaller, and normally strictly larger, than H(P), this is a rather unexpected result. The reason is that, as mentioned earlier, R = H(P) is well known to su ce for perfect secrecy in the traditional Shannontheoretic sense. The explanation for this more demanding requirement on the key rate, lies in the fact that guessing performance is determined by the large deviations (atypical) behavior of the source, whereas the more familiar equivocation criterion has to do with the typical behavior. For key-rates in the intermediate range H(P) < R < H(P ), it turns out that optimal guessing should target both the key and message statistics simultaneously. We describe such a guessing strategy and give an explicit expression for E(R; ) for this range of key-rates as well.
Finally, we relate the guessing exponent E(R; ) to the best attainable large deviations performance de ned as the probability of the event G N (XjY) 2 NL (L positive constant) as a function of L and R. It is shown that the exponential rate of this probability as a function of L for xed R, is the Fenchel-Legendre transform of E(R; ) as function of .
The outline of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we de ne the notation and give some de nitions. In Section 3, we give a single-letter characterization of the guessing exponent function and in Section 4, we investigate this function. In Section 5, we characterize the attainable large deviations performance of the guessing wiretapper, and show that the corresponding rate function is related to the guessing exponent function via the Fenchel-Legendre transform. Finally, in Section 6, we summarize the results and state some open problems.
De nitions and Notation Conventions
Throughout the paper, scalar random variables will be denoted by capital letters while their sample values will be denoted by the respective lower case letters. A similar convention will apply to random vectors and their sample values, which will be denoted by boldface letters.
Thus, for example, if X denotes a random vector (X 1 ; :::; X N ), then x = (x 1 ; :::; x N ) would designate a speci c realization of X.
The plaintext message will be assumed to be drawn from a discrete memoryless source (DMS) with a nite alphabet X and probability mass function (PMF) P = fP(x); x 2 Xg. The probability of a vector x, will be denoted P(x), which is given by
Nth order Cartezian power of X, that is, the space of all N-vectors over X, will be denoted by X N . The probability of an event A X N will be denoted by P(A) or PrfAg. We shall use the letter Q to denote a generic DMS over the alphabet X, and use the same notational conventions as for P.
For a DMS Q, we recall that the Shannon entropy is given by
where logarithms throughout the sequel are taken to the base 2. The relative entropy between Q and P is de ned as
The R enyi entropy 9] of order ( > 0, 6 = 1) associated with Q is de ned as
with H 1 (Q) being interpreted as the Shannon entropy H(Q).
For a given source vector x 2 X N , the empirical probability mass function (EPMF) is the vector Q x = fQ x (a); a 2 Xg, where Q x (a) = N x (a)=N, N x (a) being the number of occurrences of the letter a in the vector x. The set of all EPMF's of vectors in X N , that is, rational PMF's with denominator N, will be denoted by Q N . The type class T x of a vector x is the set of all vectors x 0 2 X N such that Q x 0 = Q x . When we need to attribute a type 
The Guessing Exponent Function
Our main result in this section is the following.
Theorem 1 For every DMS P and every > 0, E + (R; ) = E ? (R; ) = E(R; ); (7) where E(R; ) is de ned as in eq. (3).
The remaining part of this section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 1 along with a description of saddle-point strategies.
Proof. Since E ? (R; ) clearly cannot be strictly larger than E + (R; ), it is su cient to prove that E + (R; ) E(R; ) E ? (R; ):
The left inequality is a direct theorem whereas the right inequality is a converse theorem from the viewpoint of cryptography.
We start from the proof of the left inequality. For the sake simplicity, we will present a suboptimal (but asymptotically optimal) guessing strategy that is easy to analyze. Consider Consider next, an exhaustive key-search attack de ned by using the following guessing list f ?1 N (y; u 1 ); f ?1 N (y; u 2 ); : : :, where u 1 ; u 2 ; : : : is an arbitrary ordering of all possible key streams of length K = NR. Clearly, this guessing list nds any message x using no more To prove the right inequality in eq. (8), consider the following encryption function f N .
Given a source vector x 2 T Q , we rst compress it losslessly into a codeword c(x) of the following structure. The rst eld of l 1 (x) = dlog jQ N je bits describes the index of the type class T Q = T x . The second eld of l 2 (x) = dlog jT Q je bits gives the index of x within T Q . Now, assume that NR is integer and consider the two cases NR < log jT Q j and NR log jT Q j. If NR < log jT Q j then the second eld of the code is in turn implemented in two parts. We partition T Q into n = bjT Q j=2 NR c disjoint subsets T 1 Q ; T 2 Q ; :::; T n Q , each of size 2 NR , and perhaps an additional remainder subset T n+1
Q of size at most 2 NR ? 1. Now, the rst part of the second eld encodes the index i of the subset T i Q that contains x, whereas the second part, of NR bits, encodes the index of x within T i Q . Having compressed x in the above described manner, encryption is carried out as follows. If NR log jT Q j, then the cryptogram y is the code word c(x) with the last l 2 (x) bits encrypted using simple bit-by-bit XOR with the bits of U. (Note, that since NR is assumed integer, NR log jT Q j actually implies NR dlog jT Q je = l 2 (x).) Otherwise, only the last NR bits of the code word (that is, the second part of the second eld) are encrypted in the above manner.
For the purpose of obtaining a lower bound on EfG N (XjY) g, we may assume that the guesser is informed of the type T Q of the message x. Obviously, any lower bound on EfG N (XjY) g for such an informed guesser is also a lower bound for the original, uninformed guesser. Since P is assumed memoryless, then for any given Q, the conditional PMF P(xjx 2 T Q ) is uniform within T Q independently of P. Due to the above described encryption mechanism, the conditional probability of y given x in T Q , is given by P(yjx) 
Now there are three cases: If NR log jT Q j, then T Q \ B ?1 (y) = T Q and so, M(y) = jT Q j. Otherwise, if NR < log jT Q j and y falls in T i Q for some 1 i n, then T Q \ B ?1 (y) = T i Q , because any contents of the last NR bits form an existing code word of some x 2 T Q , and so, M(y) = 2 NR . Finally, if NR < log jT Q j and x 2 T n+1 Q , then T Q \B ?1 (y) = T n+1 Q , which might be small, but this happens with probability jT n+1 Q j=jT Q j ( 
Finally, by averaging w.r.t. the probabilities of fT Q g, taking advantage of the fact that PrfT Q g 2 ?ND(QjjP)?o(N) , and using the method of types, we conclude that for the above described encryption scheme, and for any guessing strategy, lim inf
Since we have considered a speci c encryption scheme, the left-hand side is clearly a lower bound on E ? (R; ), and this completes the proof of the right inequality in eq. (8). 2
It is interesting to note that both the guessing strategy and the encryption strategy described in the above proof are universally asymptotically optimum in the sense of being independent of the underlying memoryless source P and the moment order . Recall, that the strictly optimum guessing strategy depends on fP(xjy)g and hence also on fP(x)g.
A More Explicit Expression
In this section, we give a more explicit expression for the guessing exponent function E(R; ) and investigate its behavior as a function of R for xed . (20) where the maximization and minimization are interchangeable because the bracketed expression is concave in Q and a ne in .
Let P s = fP s (x); x 2 Xg denote an auxiliary DMS with letter probabilities given by P s (x) = P 1=(1+s) (x) P x 0 2X P 1=(1+s) (x 0 ) : (21) It is easy to show (see, e.g., 1]) that for s > 0, max Q sH(Q) ? D(QjjP)] = sH 1=(1+s) (P ); (22) and that the maximum is achieved by Q = P s . Thus, we have E(R; ) = min 0 H 1=(1+ ) (P ) + ( ? )R]: (23) It is also easy to check that
Thus, the derivative of bracketed term in (23) w.r.t. is H(P ) ? R. Since H(P ) is nondecreasing in 0 (as can be easily shown using eq. (22) R R < H(P)
where R is the unique solution of the equation R = H(P ) for R in the range H(P) R H(P ).
Thus, for low rates, i.e., R H(P), the guessing exponent E(R; ) is just R, which can be interpreted as a situation where the key-rate is so small that it pays o just to make an exhaustive search over all possible key sequences, namely, examine f N (y; u i ), for all i = 1; 2; :::; 2 NR , and essentially all of them will be examined (in the exponential sense).
On the other extreme of high key-rates, R > H(P ), we have E(R; ) = H 1=(1+ ) (P ) (a plateau region), which means that the cryptogram Y is so \noisy" that it is e ectively useless for guessing X and the wiretapper might as well ignore it and guess at X directly only from knowledge of the prior probabilities fP(x)g. It is not surprising then, that the term H 1=(1+ ) (P ) coincides with the guessing exponent without side-information studied in 1].
For key-rates between H(P) and H(P ), corresponding to the curvy part of the function E(R; ), the optimal guessing strategy can be thought of as a combination of exhaustive search for the key and the message (in the spirit of the rst part of the proof of Theorem 1).
Next consider the slope of E(R; ) as a function of R for a xed . The partial derivative @E(R; )=@R equals for R < H(P), and equals zero for R > H(P ). For H(P) < R < H(P ), we have @E(R; ) @R
= ? R :
The function R is increasing in R in the range H(P) < R < H(P ), which starts at R = 0 for R = H(P) and monotonically increases to R = at R = H(P ). Thus, ? R is decreasing in R, and hence, E(R; For the left inequality, consider again the guessing strategy described in the proof of Theorem 1. Since G N (xjy) 2 minf2 NR ; 2 NH(Qx) g = 2 2 Nh(Qx;R) , the probability that G N (XjY) would exceed 2 NL cannot be larger than the probability of the event h(Q X ; R) + 1=N > L, which is easily shown (using the method of types) to decay exponentially at the rate of F(R; L).
To prove the right inequality in eq. (32), consider again the encryption scheme f N described in the proof of Theorem 1. Using the same considerations as in the proof of 
This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 2
Note that the same encryption and guessing strategies of the proof of Theorem 1, are also asymptotically optimal in the large deviations sense.
We next show that E(R; ) and F(R; L) are related via the Fenchel-Legendre transform.
Theorem 3 For a DMS P and every key rate R, The second equality of (37) follows from the fact that F(R; L) = 1 for L > R. As for eq.
(38), we have the following. where the interchangeability of minimization and maximization is justi ed by the fact that the bracketed expression is a ne in and concave in Q. This is true because h(Q; R) is the minimum between a constant and a concave function of Q. This completes the proof of Theorem 3. 2 
Open Problems
In this paper, we introduced measures of cryptographic security that are based on the notion of guessing, and gave formulas for computing them. To this end, we have combined earlier works on guessing with Shannon-theoretic cryptography. We would like to mention some extensions of the present problem setting, which might be interesting to consider for future research.
First, it would be of interest to generalize the results to sources with memory, such as Markov sources, that can model natural languages. Secondly, one might consider the case in which the wiretapper is not required to reconstruct the message X exactly, but allowed some reconstruction error. In other words, as soon as the wiretapper provides a guess within distortion level D from the true message 2], we might regard the cipher as broken. The problem then is to determine the guessing and large deviations exponents. This type of reconstruction with some distortion has been studied by Yamamoto 12] in the ordinary paradigm of the Shannon cipher system. Another extension that might be considered is the case where the wiretapper observes a noisy version of the cryptogram, e.g., after Y passes through a noisy channel. It would be of interest to determine how the wiretapper's performance would be degraded in that case. 
